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Emphasis added. The reviewing court must accord considerable deference to an agency's resolution of factual issues, "ascertaining [only] whether there was substantial evidence in the. State Water Control Bd. Kenley, 6 Va. This distinction "recognizes the 'special competence' of the judiciary to decide issues of 'common law,' 'constitutional law' or 'statutory interpretation'" and a concommitant responsibility not to "'merely rubber-stamp an agency determination.
Caldwell, Va. The intention of the legislature must always control. Last v. State Bd. Commonwealth, 6 Va. Lukhard, Va. If "the words of [a] statute are clear and unambiguous," we "give them their plain meaning," and the 2 "general rules of statutory construction" are unnecessary. Diggs, 6 Va. The judiciary may not "change or amend [legislative] enactments under the guise of construing them. Here, we find nothing complex or unclear in the term "good cause" as it relates to termination of a distribution agreement under the Act.
Considered together and in proper context, the words simply mean a "well-founded" "reason. This very ordinary definition of plain words, used nontechnically, comports perfectly with a statutory scheme intended at once to protect wholesalers from "unfair treatment. In the event of dispute, the Board has statutory responsibility to "determine if there is good cause" to terminate in such instance, with the burden of proof on the winery. Contrary to wholesalers' contention, the statutory references to circumstances which expressly do or do not constitute the contemplated "good cause" introduce no ambiguity to the analysis.
Rather, the legislature simply elected to specifically exclude "the sale or purchase of a winery" from the broad sweep of "good cause" and to include certain specific instances of wholesaler deficiency. These express inclusions and exclusions embrace diverse and unrelated circumstances and clearly impose no limitation on one another or any unmentioned good causes for termination under the Act.
The issue does not involve "the substantiality of the evidential support for findings of fact," id. Instead, when, as here, the question involves a statutory interpretation issue, "little deference is required to be accorded the agency decision" because the issue falls outside the agency's specialized competence.
Johnston-Willis, Ltd. Kenley, 6 Va. In sum, pure statutory interpretation is the prerogative of the judiciary. See Hampton Roads Sanitation Dist. Comm'n v. City of Chesapeake, Va. Thus, we turn to the question of law presented, the crux of the issue being to determine the meaning of "good cause" as used in the Act. Like the circuit court, we decline to adopt either argument made by the opposing parties.
We reject the position of the wholesalers and the Board that "good cause" under the statute as it existed in September requires in every instance establishment of wholesaler deficiency. Were that the case, the legislature performed a meaningless act by including in the statute an example of what is not "good cause," that is, the term "shall not include the sale or purchase of a winery.
Raven Red Ash Coal Corp. Absher, Va. We also reject the position of the winery, implicitly endorsed by the Court of Appeals, that "good cause" always exists when a winery unilaterally cancels a wholesaler agreement in the good faith exercise of its business judgment.
Under such an approach, potentially any decision of a winery, not made in bad faith or arbitrarily, to so terminate existing agreements could be viewed as a good faith exercise of business judgment. If such a decision were sufficient to establish "good cause," the Act's statutory protections also would be meaningless. See Wright-Moore Corp.
Ricoh Corp. An examination of the winery's specific business decision made in this case requires the unavoidable conclusion that the winery has not established sufficient "good cause" under the statute. According to the stipulation, the winery's "basis for the terminations was its desire to consolidate its brands into fewer wholesalers over broader geographic areas. To determine whether "consolidation" or so-called "down-sizing" amounts to statutory "good cause," we examine other portions of the Act, specifically portions dealing with the sale of a winery.
As the circuit court observed, the purchase and sale of a winery likely may lead to some duplication in the pre-sale distribution network of the two wineries thus requiring "some streamlining or other internal reorganization" by the surviving winery. In other words, when one winery purchases another, thus inheriting a duplicative network of Virginia distributors, efforts to consolidate become probable.
Yet the statute specifically provides that the sale or purchase of a winery is not "good cause" for termination of wholesaler agreements. If the General Assembly had meant that a winery's consolidation of its distributorships to streamline operations would amount to "good cause," it would have so provided in the situation of a sale or purchase of a winery.
Thus, we hold, under the stipulated facts, that the winery's good faith exercise of business judgment, there being no evidence of deficiencies in the wholesalers' performances, is not "good cause" under the Act for the winery to terminate unilaterally its agreements with the wholesalers without reasonable compensation. Two days prior to the argument, counsel for the wholesalers notified the Court of an enactment passed by the General Assembly and signed into law by the Governor as emergency legislation effective February 26, In essence, the amendment provides that "good cause" shall not be construed to exist without a finding of a material deficiency for which the wholesaler is responsible.
According to its provisions, the amendment applies in any case in which "good cause" is alleged to exist based on circumstances not specifically set forth in the subdivisions of the statute that enumerate certain examples of wholesaler deficiencies. The enactment also provides: "That the provisions of this act are declaratory of existing law. At the bar, counsel for the wholesalers contended that, in the amendment, the General Assembly made "a legislative interpretation of the original Act.
Counsel for the winery also argued that the amendment is retroactive legislation impairing the obligation of its contracts in violation of Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia, citing Heublein, Inc. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, Va.
We shall not rule on the effect, if any, of the enactment on the issue presented in this case because we have confined our analysis of the Act to the provisions that were in place in September when this controversy arose. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals will be reversed and final judgment will be entered here reinstating that portion of the Board's "Final Decision and Order" dated November 22, , as follows:.
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